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INTRODUCTION
At the intersection of administrative law and product liability law
stands the conflict between the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
(MMWA) 1 and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).2 One commenta-
tor has dubbed the conflict between these two acts the "Clash of the
Federal Titans."3 At the heart of this conflict lies the tension between
two major doctrines of statutory interpretation: the doctrine of agency
deference arising from the Chevron line of cases and the doctrine of
the federal policy favoring arbitration arising out of the McMahon line
of cases. One scholar has called Chevron4 "foundational" and "a quasi-
constitutional text."5 The McMahon 6 line of cases that sprung out of
the FAA in the 1980s has created significant controversy in the area of
alternative dispute resolution, and commentators have questioned
whether binding arbitration provides a fair forum for consumer dis-
putes. 7 The Supreme Court has found that the FAA requires binding
arbitration under a variety of laws, including the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), Sherman Antitrust Act, Securi-
ties Act of 1933, and Securities Exchange Act of 1934.8
Recent case law and scholarly literature are deeply split as to how
courts should properly resolve this clash. Some have argued that ap-
plying the McMahon factors9 requires clear evidence that Congress in-
tended to preclude enforcing the national policy favoring
arbitration.' 0 Others have argued that Congress provided such a re-
I Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Star. 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312
(2000)).
2 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
3 Katherine R. Guerin, Clash of the Federal Titans: The Federal Arbitration Act v. the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Will the Consumer Win or Lose?, 13 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 4, 4
(2001).
4 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). For
further discussion of Chevron, see infra Part I.C.
5 Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188 (2006).
6 Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). For further discus-
sion of McMahon, see infra Part I.B.
7 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Self-Deregulation, the "National Policy" of the Supreme Court,
3 NEV. L.J. 259, 276 (2002-2003) ("It is fanciful to speak of [predispute arbitration clauses
in consumer transactions] as contractual for they are anything but an expression of mutual
assent."); Guerin, supra note 3, at 33 (discussing the importance of a "day in court").
8 See Katie Wiechens, Note, Arbitrating Consumer Claims Under the Magnuson-Moss War-
ranty Act, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1459, 1464 (2001).
9 See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227.
10 See, e.g., Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 475 (5th Cir. 2002);
Wiechens, supra note 8, at 1476-78.
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peal in the MMWA. 11 Similarly, in the area of administrative law,
some have argued that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is clearly
entitled to Chevron deference because Congress has either implicitly
or explicitly delegated to the FTC the power to regulate both the con-
tents of consumer warranties and the "informal dispute resolution
mechanisms" provided by warrantors.1 2 Others have argued that the
FTC is not so entitled because Congress clearly spoke to the issue.1 3
The debate regarding the MMWA's relationship to the FAA laid
dormant for many years after Congress passed the MMWA. The FAA
never compelled binding arbitration under a federal law that pro-
vided a judicial remedy until Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc.14 in 1985, ten years after the MMWA became law.' 5 The
first case to encounter the MMWA and FAA clash, Wilson v. Waverlee
Homes, Inc.,t 6 investigated the legislative history to discern Congress's
intent toward arbitration. 17 The court only briefly discussed the FTC
regulations and never addressed Chevron.18
This Note argues that the MMWA and its interpretation by the
FTC preclude binding arbitration agreements. The text, legislative
history, and purpose of the MMWA clearly indicate that Congress did
not intend the FAA presumption in favor of arbitration to apply to the
MMWA under the McMahon test.19 Furthermore, this Note argues
that the courts owe Chevron deference to the FTC in this area because
Congress provided for notice-and-comment rulemaking and explicitly
delegated power to the FTC to promulgate rules for "informal dispute
settlement procedures" under the MMWA. Finally, this Note demon-
strates that the FTC regulations under the MMWA pass both prongs of
the Chevron test and that courts should not subsume the McMahon fac-
tors under either prong.
11 See, e.g., Andrew P. Lamis, The New Age of Artificial Legal Reasoning as Reflected in the
Judicial Treatment of the Magnuson-Moss Act and the Federal Arbitration Act, 15 Lov. CONSUMER
L. REv. 173, 174-75, 231 (2003).
12 See, e.g., Walton, 298 F.3d at 480-92 (King, CJ., dissenting); Rickard v. Teynor's
Homes, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 910, 919-22 (N.D. Ohio 2003); Daniel G. Lloyd, The
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act v. the Federal Arbitration Act: the Quintessential Chevron Case, 16
Loy. CONSUMER L. RF.V. 1, 18-19 (2003).
1- See, e.g., Walton, 298 F.3d at 475; Wiechens, supra note 8, at 1476.
14 473 U.S. 614, 625-26 (1985).
15 The MMWA became law on January 4, 1975. See Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183
(1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2000)).
16 954 F. Supp. 1530 (M.D. Ala. 1997), affd, 127 F.3d 40 (11th Cir. 1997), abrogated by
Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2002).
17 See id. at 1537-40.
18 See id. at 1538-39.
19 See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987) (stating the
standard for rebutting the presumption favoring arbitration); Lamis, supra note 11, at
174-75.
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Part I of this Note provides background on the MMWA, the FAA,
the McMahon doctrine, the Chevron doctrine, and recent attempts by
courts and scholars to resolve the conflict in this area. Part II analyzes
the interplay between the two conflicting statutes and the two conflict-
ing doctrines, and argues that courts should apply the McMahon test
before the Chevron test. Part II then uses the McMahon factors to show
that Congress intended to preclude binding arbitration. Part III ar-
gues that, for any remaining questions regarding the contours of arbi-
tration, courts should give Chevron deference to the FTC
interpretation of the MMWA because Congress clearly delegated to
the FTC the power to interpret the MMWA. 20 Part IV applies the
Chevron framework to the MMWA regulations and demonstrates that
the FTC interpretation deserves deference under both prongs of the
framework. This Note concludes by arguing that, when read properly
in light of both McMahon and Chevron, the MMWA precludes binding
arbitration.
I
BACKGROUND OF STATUTES, CASES, AND SCHOLARSHIP
A. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
In 1967, Senators Warren Magnuson and Carl Hayden intro-
duced federal legislation designed to improve consumer warranties. 21
During the late 1960s, the federal government undertook a number
of studies analyzing the effectiveness of consumer warranties.22 An
FTC study concluded that automobile warranty coverage provided by
manufacturers was inadequate and that issues of quality control en-
dangered public safety.23 In 1974, seven years after Magnuson and
Hayden introduced legislation and four years after the FTC issued its
final report on automobile warranties, Representative John E. Moss
asked the staff of the House Subcommittee on Commerce and Fi-
nance to investigate the steps that various industries had taken to rem-
edy the problems identified in the FTC report.24 The staff found that
manufacturers of a wide range of consumer products provided war-
ranties that were lengthy and difficult to understand. 25 Ultimately,
Congress enacted and President Ford signed the Magnuson-Moss War-
20 See Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 481, 490 (5th Cir. 2002)
(King, C.J., dissenting); Lloyd, supra note 12, at 18-21, 27.
21 See 2 BARKLEY CLARK & CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT WARRANTIES
§ 14:2 (2d ed. 2002).
22 See id.
23 See id.
24 See id.
25 See 120 CONG. REC. 31,304, 31,318 (1974); CLARK & SMITH, supra note 21, § 14:2.
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ranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act into law on Janu-
ary 4, 1975.26
Studies during this period showed not only that existing warran-
ties fell short of consumers' expectations but also that manufacturers
were creating new express warranties during the middle of the twenti-
eth century that were even less effective than the implied warranties
available under common and statutory law.2 7 As the House Report for
the MMWA noted, "[a] nother growing source of resentment has been
the inability to get many of these products properly repaired and the
developing awareness that the paper with the filigree border bearing
the bold caption 'Warranty' or 'Guarantee' was often of no greater
worth than the paper it was printed on."28 The report discussed that
prior subcommittee hearings exposed four major areas in which con-
sumer warranties needed improvement: first, making the language
easier to understand; second, clearly defining classes of "full" and
"limited" warranties; third, providing "safeguards against the dis-
claimer or modification of' implied warranties; and fourth, "providing
consumers with access to reasonable and effective remedies" for
breaches of warranties.2 9
The MMWA addressed these problems by delegating to the FTC
the power to establish rules that govern the content of warranties.
3 0
Congress directed the FTC to consider a long list of topics that war-
ranties should address, including: "what the warrantor [would] do in
the event of a defect, malfunction, or failure to conform with such
written warranty";3 ' when the warrantor would perform its obliga-
tions;3 2 and which parts of the product the warranty did not cover.
33
Additionally, the MMWA invested the FTC with the authority to re-
quire that warrantors use "words or phrases which would not mislead
a reasonable, average consumer as to the nature or scope of the
warranty. " 34
The MMWA also delegated power to the FTC to prescribe rules
governing consumer remedies.3 5 The FTC may prescribe rules requir-
ing the warrantor to provide a "step-by-step procedure" detailing the
26 See Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1974) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312
(2000)); CLARK & SMITH, supra note 21, § 14:2.
27 See CURTIS R. REITZ, CONSUMER PRODUCr WARRANTIES UNDER FEDERAL AND STATE
LAws § 1.03 (2d ed. 1987).
28 H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, at 24 (1974).
29 Id. at 29.
30 See 15 U.S.C. § 2302 (2000).
31 Id. § 2302(a) (4).
32 See id. § 2302(a)(10).
33 See id. § 2302(a)(12).
34 Id. § 2302(a) (13).
35 See id. § 2310.
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actions consumers must take to force warrantor performance. 36 Fur-
thermore, the FTC may prescribe rules requiring the warrantor to
provide "[i] nformation respecting the availability of any informal dis-
pute settlement procedure offered by the warrantor and a recital,
where the warranty so provides, that the purchaser may be required to
resort to such procedure before pursuing any legal remedies in the
courts. "
3 7
In a separate section of the MMWA, Congress explicitly delegated
to the FTC the power to "prescribe rules setting forth minimum re-
quirements for any informal dispute settlement procedure which is
incorporated into the terms of a written warranty to which any provi-
sion of [the MMWA] applies. ' 38 The MMWA also requires the FTC to
provide in these rules for "participation in such [informal dispute set-
tlement] procedure by independent or governmental entities. 39
Soon after the passage of the MMWA, the FTC promulgated rules
that specifically prohibited binding arbitration in settlement proce-
dures governed by the MMWA. 40 These rules prohibited binding arbi-
tration based on the FTC's view that binding arbitration was contrary
to the intent of Congress and that, even if it was not contrary to such
intent, the FTC was "not ... convinced that any guidelines which it set
out could ensure sufficient protections for consumers."41 The Code
of Federal Regulations contains rules governing "Informal Dispute
Settlement Procedures" 42 which provide that "[d]ecisions of the
Mechanism shall not be legally binding on any person."43 Further-
more, the regulations require that the persons deciding disputes must
disclose to consumers the decision, the warrantors' intended actions,
and the consumers' rights to pursue legal remedies if they are dissatis-
fied with either the decision or intended actions. 44
B. Federal Arbitration Act
Congress intended to address a different need when it passed the
Federal Arbitration Act than when it passed the Magnuson-Moss War-
ranty Act. 4 5 The FAA requires that "[a] written provision in .. . a
36 See id. § 2302(a) (7).
37 Id. § 2302(a)(8).
38 Id. § 2310(a)(2).
39 Id.
40 See Rules, Regulations, Statements, and Interpretations Under Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, 40 Fed. Reg. 60,168, 60,210-11 (Dec. 31, 1975).
41 Id.
42 16 C.F.R. pt. 703 (2006).
43 Id. § 703.5(j).
44 See id. § 703.5(d) (4), (g)(1).
45 See Guerin, supra note 3, at 7-8 (explaining that Congress passed the FAA "in an
effort to dispel judiciary hostility towards arbitration based on the view that it was a dis-
placement of the judiciary function").
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contract evidencing a transaction involving [interstate] commerce to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such con-
tract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable. 4 6
Although Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925,
the Act lay dormant for many years.4 7 In Wilko v. Swan,48 the Court
limited the scope of the FAA by holding that a party cannot validly
waive the right to select ajudicial forum.49 The Court resurrected the
FAA through a series of cases beginning in the mid-1980s with Mitsub-
ishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth.50 In Mitsubishi, the Court
held that an agreement to arbitrate did not impermissibly limit the
substantive rights of a party. 51 The Court further held that even statu-
tory rights were subject to arbitration. 52 The Court declared that this
trade between a judicial and arbitral forum was procedural rather
than substantive. 53 A party that agreed to arbitration traded the "pro-
cedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplic-
ity, informality, and expedition of arbitration. '" 54
In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, the Court articu-
lated the test for determining whether a statute precluded binding
arbitration under the FAA. 55 The Court began by addressing the
scope of the FAA, citing two of its prior decisions, Moses H. Cone Memo-
rial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. and Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v.
Byrd, that, respectively, declared the existence of a "'federal policy
favoring arbitration'- 56 and stated that the Court would "'rigorously
enforce agreements to arbitrate.' "5 7 The McMahon Court explained
that it would look to the "text, history, or purposes of the statute" to
determine whether Congress intended to preclude arbitration under
the FAA.58 After articulating this test, the Court explicitly limited the
reach of Wilko by declaring that "the mistrust of arbitration that
formed the basis for the Wilko opinion in 1953 is difficult to square
with the assessment of arbitration that has prevailed since that time. 59
46 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
47 See Guerin, supra note 3, at 7-8 (explaining that courts initially resisted the FAA).
48 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
49 See id. at 437; Guerin, supra note 3, at 8.
50 473 U.S. 614 (1985); see also Guerin, supra note 3, at 8 (discussing the Court's early
applications of the FAA).
51 See 473 U.S. at 628.
52 See id.
53 See id.
54 Id.
55 See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987).
56 Id. at 226 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 24 (1983)).
57 Id. (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
58 Id. at 227.
59 Id. at 233.
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C. Chevron
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., has
become one of the most frequently cited cases in American law. 60
Courts use the so-called Chevron two-step to determine whether to up-
hold an agency interpretation under delegated powers from
Congress. 61
Recently, the most controversial issue in the Chevron jurispru-
dence has been whether courts should apply the "Chevron two-step"
procedure at all. 62 The key question is whether a promulgated rule
has the "force of law" and therefore is entitled to Chevron deference or
whether it is not promulgated under either an implicit or explicit con-
gressional delegation and therefore is only entitled to more limited
deference corresponding to the agency's expertise. 63 This inquiry is
often called "Chevron step zero."64 Cass Sunstein argues that whether
courts should apply the Chevron framework has become one of the
most confusing questions in administrative law.65 He argues that the
Court ought to avoid the question of Chevron deference when it can;
when it cannot avoid the question, however, it should more frequently
apply Chevron and defer to the agency interpretation. 66
The Court recently addressed the scope of Chevron in United States
v. Mead.67 In Mead, the Court articulated the test for whether a rule
would be entitled to Chevron deference as whether it "appears that
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority."6 8 The
Court pointed to two agency powers exercised pursuant to a delega-
tion from Congress, adjudication and notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing, as examples of evidence that Congress intended the agency's
interpretation of a statute to have the force of law. 69
60 See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823, 823 (2006) (calling Chevron "one
of the most important rulings in the past quarter century in American public law").
61 See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 190-91.
62 See id. at 191.
63 See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226-27, 234 (2001).
64 This term was coined by Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman. See Thomas
W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001). It is also
the title of an article by Cass Sunstein. See Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 5.
65 See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 190-91.
66 See id. at 191-92.
67 533 U.S. 218.
68 Id. at 226-27.
69 See id. at 227.
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D. The Clash: Chevron Meets McMahon
Following the creation of the McMahon doctrine and the
strengthening of the FAA, lower federal courts and state courts faced
for the first time the issue of whether the FTC regulation prohibiting
binding arbitration under the MMWA was invalid due to the FAA and
its federal policy favoring arbitration. In the first case that raised this
issue, Wilson v. Waverlee Homes, Inc.,70 the court did not reach the "is-
sues of whether the FAA and arbitration agreements in general are
unenforceable as to all claims based on the Magnuson-Moss Act."'v
The court held that the FAA did not apply in this case because a con-
tract involving an arbitration clause had only been established be-
tween the purchaser and retailer, and the manufacturer did not have
standing to enforce this contract. 72 The court held that even if the
manufacturer had standing to enforce the arbitration clause, the
clause would have been invalid because the MMWA precluded the
manufacturer from including a binding arbitration clause in a war-
ranty agreement.73 The court reasoned that the manufacturer did not
include such a clause in its contracts with consumers because of the
clarity of the MMWA and the FTC regulations.7 4 The court declared
that it would not allow Waverlee Homes to "do by surrogate or vicari-
ous means what it [wa]s forbidden to do on its own behalf."75 The
court decided that it would not uphold binding arbitration clauses
under the MMWA and found that such a result would be "profoundly
inequitable." 7 6
To bolster its argument that the MMWA clearly indicated Con-
gress's intent to preclude binding arbitration, the district court care-
fully reviewed the legislative history of the MMWA and the history of
the regulations.77 The court found that the history of the MMWA
clearly prohibited binding arbitration and pointed to Congressman
Moss's statement that the dispute resolution mechanisms of the
MMWA were a prerequisite to suit.78 The court also noted that the
House Report explicitly stated that "'[a] n adverse decision in any in-
formal dispute settlement proceeding would not be a bar to a civil
action on the warranty involved in the proceeding.'"79
70 954 F. Supp. 1530 (M.D. Ala. 1997), affd, 127 F.3d 40 (11th Cir. 1997), abrogated by
Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2002).
71 Id. at 1538 n.2.
72 See id. at 1538-39.
73 See id. at 1539.
74 See id. at 1538-39.
75 Id. at 1539.
76 Id. at 1540.
77 See id. at 1538-39.
78 See id. at 1538 (citing 119 CONG. Rac. 926, 972 (1973)).
79 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-1107 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702,
7723).
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The district court found that the regulations promulgated by the
FTC after the passage of the MMWA provided additional support for
the position that the MMWA prohibited binding arbitration.80 The
regulations explicitly stated that "'decisions of the mechanism shall
not be legally binding on any person."' 81 In looking at the history of
the regulations, the court noted that the commission responded to
industry comments favoring binding arbitration by maintaining that
Congress had a contrary intent and that it could not promulgate
guidelines for binding arbitration that would offer sufficient protec-
tion to the consumer.8 2
For several years after Wilson, federal courts unanimously agreed
that the MMWA prohibited binding arbitration clauses.8 3 After five
years of unanimity, however, two federal courts of appeals addressed
the issue and held the exact opposite-that the FAA overrode the
MMWA. In Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC 84 and Davis v. Southern
Energy Homes, Inc. respectively,8 5 the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits found
binding arbitration clauses enforceable under the MMWA in spite of
the FTC regulations. The two courts both found that the MMWA
failed the McMahon test.8 6 A vigorous dissent in Walton called for
Chevron deference to the FTC regulations and refused to apply
McMahon.8 7
Both courts engaged in fairly similar McMahon analyses. The
courts laid out the McMahon factors and argued that neither the
MMWA's text, legislative history, nor purpose addressed the question
of binding arbitration of disputes.88 Both courts found that Congress
did not address binding arbitration at all based on a reading of the
words "informal dispute resolution mechanisms" in the MMWA.8 9
Thus, they found that the statute failed the McMahon analysis.90
The two courts differed greatly, however, in their Chevron analy-
ses. The Fifth Circuit based its finding-that Congress had spoken to
the issue in the FAA and thus the FTC regulations were not entitled to
80 See id.
81 Id. (quoting 16 C.F.R. § 703.50)).
82 See id. at 1539 (discussing Rules, Regulations, Statements, and Interpretations
Under Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 40 Fed. Reg. 60,168, 60,210 (Dec. 31, 1975)).
83 NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER WARRANTY LAW § 13.4.6.3 (Carolyn
L. Carter et al. eds., 3d ed. 2006); see also Pitchford v. Oakwood Mobile Homes, 124 F.
Supp. 2d 958 (W.D. Va. 2000); Raesley v. Grand Hous., Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 562 (S.D.
Miss. 2000).
84 298 F.3d 470, 479 (5th Cir. 2002).
85 305 F.3d 1268, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002).
86 See id.; Walton, 298 F.3d at 478.
87 See 298 F.3d at 480 (King, C.J., dissenting).
88 See Davis, 305 F.3d at 1273; Walton, 298 F.3d at 475.
89 See Davis, 305 F.3d at 1274; Walton, 298 F.3d at 475-76.
90 See Davis, 305 F.3d at 1273-77 (using a factor-by-factor analysis); Walton, 298 F.3d at
478.
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deference-on the first prong of Chevron.9 1 The Eleventh Circuit,
agreeing with the dissent in the Fifth Circuit as to the crux of the
problem but differing in the outcome, found that the FTC regulations
were not reasonable. 92 The Eleventh Circuit found the FTC regula-
tions unreasonable because they were based on hostility toward arbi-
tration as disadvantageous to consumers, a hostility that the Supreme
Court later abandoned. 93 The Eleventh Circuit criticized the Fifth
Circuit dissent because the Eleventh Circuit saw the reference to con-
gressional intent in the new regulations as being insignificant com-
pared to the original rationale of hostility to arbitration on the basis of
its perceived disadvantages for consumers. 9 4
The Fifth Circuit dissent found the FTC's reading to be reasona-
ble based on the two considerations given in the original materials
accompanying the regulations in the Federal Register-the FTC's in-
terpretation of legislative intent based on a commerce subcommittee
staff report and the FTC's concern over the effect of binding arbitra-
tion on consumer rights. 95 The dissent differentiated the MMWA
from RICO, the statute at issue in McMahon, by noting that the FTC's
regulatory review of the statute confirmed that the FTC based the
original regulations on its independent reading of the statute, not on
the Supreme Court's perceived hostility toward binding arbitration. 96
The dissent noted that the FTC's recent regulatory review confirmed
that the FTC still believed that the MMWA precluded binding arbitra-
tion even in light of Wilko and subsequent Supreme Court endorse-
ments of arbitration. 9 7
The Fifth Circuit majority never reached the second prong of the
Chevron test because it found under the first prong of Chevron that
Congress had already addressed the question at issue-whether the
MMWA permitted binding arbitration-in the then-fifty-year-old
FAA. 98 Therefore, the court moved to consider whether the MMWA
evinces an intention contrary to Congress's intent as expressed in the
FAA.9 9 The court applied the McMahon test and found that Congress
had not expressed a contrary intention.1 00
91 See Walton, 298 F.3d at 475.
92 See Davis, 305 F.3d at 1278-79; Walton, 298 F.3d at 483 (King, C.J., dissenting).
93 See Davis, 305 F.3d at 1279-80.
94 See id.
95 See Walton, 298 F.3d at 486-87 (King, C.J., dissenting) (discussing Rules, Regula-
tions, Statements, and Interpretations Under Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 40 Fed. Reg.
60,167, 60,210 (Dec. 31, 1975)).
96 See id. (King, C.J., dissenting).
97 See id. at 487-88 (King, C.J., dissenting).
98 See id. at 475.
99 See id.
100 See id. at 475-78.
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Responding to the majority, the Fifth Circuit dissent noted the
contradiction in determining that Congress expressed intent in the
FAA with regard to binding arbitration in the MMWA. l0' The dissent
agreed that words in a statute should be read in context and that in
cases such as FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. the Supreme
Court had looked to the use of the word "injury" in statutes addressing
tobacco regulation, the area of law at issue in that case. 10 2 The dissent
also acknowledged that the interpretation of a later statute may give
meaning to words in a prior statute. 10 3 As the dissent pointed out,
however, the majority incorrectly claimed that "Congress ha[d] 'di-
rectly spoken to the precise question' of how to interpret § 2310 of
the MMWA on a general policy expressed in a prior, less specific stat-
ute. ' 10 4 The dissent then noted that "[t]he Supreme Court ha[d]
never invoked similar reasoning in applying the first prong of the
Chevron inquiry."1 0 5 The dissent concluded that "[n] either the text of
§ 2310 nor the statutory context . . . conclusively indicates whether
§ 2310 applies to arbitration proceedings."'10 6
After these decisions by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, only one
federal court outside of those circuits has addressed whether binding
arbitration clauses are enforceable under the MMWA. In Rickard v.
Teynor's Homes, Inc.,10 7 the district court agreed with the Fifth Circuit
dissent that Congress had "'delegated authority to the agency gener-
ally to make rules carrying the force of law' "108 and that the FTC's
interpretation was "a reasonable construction of the statute."'10 9
E. Scholars Enter the Fray
Scholarly articles vary as to whether they consider the McMahon
test or the Chevron test to be determinative."10 Most articles consider
the McMahon test to be the primary test."' These articles are split on
whether the MMWA indicated that the intent of Congress was to pro-
hibit binding arbitration. Two of these articles argue that the FTC
101 See id. at 482-85 (King, CJ., dissenting).
102 See id. at 482-83 (King, CJ., dissenting).
103 See id. at 483 (King, CJ., dissenting).
104 Id. (King, CJ., dissenting).
105 Id. (King, CJ., dissenting).
106 Id. at 485 (King, C.J., dissenting).
107 279 F. Supp. 2d 910 (N.D. Ohio 2003).
108 Id. at 920 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001)).
109 Id. at 921.
110 Compare Lamis, supra note 11 (prioritizing McMahon), with Wiechens, supra note 8
(arguing that while McMahon is not applicable, courts should apply Chevron).
111 See generally Lamis, supra note 11 (prioritizing McMahon); Marc E. Gunter, Note,
Can Warrantors Make an End Run? The Magnuson-Moss Act and Mandatory Arbitration in Writ-
ten Warranties, 34 GA. L. RaV. 1483 (2000) (prioritizing McMahon); Recent Case, Walton v.
Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2002), 116 HARv. L. REV. 1201 (2003)
(proposing that courts should limit the Chevron analysis in favor of the McMahon analysis).
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regulation ought to be upheld because Congress clearly indicated in
the MMWA its intent to preclude binding arbitration. 112 Andrew
Lamis employs the three-prong McMahon test in an attempt to show
that the Walton and Davis courts were wrong in their application of the
test.' 13 Lamis's article looks carefully at the meaning of the words "in-
formal dispute settlement procedure" and concludes that at the time
of the MMWA, this language encompassed arbitration. 114 In discuss-
ing the MMWA's legislative history, the article points to several in-
stances in which Congress clearly considered only two different types
of remedies available to consumers: legal remedies in courts and pri-
vate remedies including arbitration.' '5 Finally, the article argues that
the MMWA's purpose is to protect consumers who are forced into
involuntary agreements that they cannot negotiate, a purpose totally
incompatible with voluntary arbitration. 116
The articles arguing that the MMWA fails the McMahon test gen-
erally address the test similarly to how the courts in Walton and Davis
applied it. One comment carefully followed the Walton court in first
investigating the Chevron test, finding that Congress had spoken to the
issue, and then applying the McMahon test. 1 7 Raising the issue of im-
plied repeal, another piece argues that courts generally construe stat-
utory language so as to avoid a situation in which Congress would
repeal another law by implication.' 18 This piece continues by arguing
that because Congress "cannot delegate to an agency the authority to
override congressional statutes," the FTC must claim that the MMWA
created a partial implied repeal of the FAA that is clear from the text
of the statute.1 19 A partial implied repeal may only arise if Congress's
intent is "clear and unambiguous."'120 The piece points out, however,
that the FTC must first find Congress's intent regarding arbitration to
be ambiguous to even reach Chevron's second prong.121 The piece
argues that to resolve this difficult situation, the FTC should interpret
the MMWA so as to not conflict with the FAA and thus not create a
situation in which it is arguing for an implied repeal, something
"strongly disfavored" by the courts. 122
112 See Lamis, supra note 11, at 176-84; Gunter, supra note 111, at 1486.
113 See generally Lamis, supra note 11 (arguing that Congress intended to preclude bind-
ing arbitration).
114 See id. at 189-94.
115 See id. at 211.
116 See id. at 235-37, 239-41.
117 See Wiechens, supra note 8, at 1470-72.
118 See Recent Case, supra note 111, at 1205-06.
119 Id. at 1205.
120 Id.
122 Id.
122 Id. at 1205-06.
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Only Daniel Lloyd addresses this issue predominantly in the con-
text of the Chevron test. 12 3 He considers the test mainly in the context
of the recent decisions in Mead and Barnhart v. Walton.124 Lloyd does
not, however, frontally address whether the McMahon test would
trump Chevron deference (other than to distinguish the MMWA from
some of the prior statutes that the Court considered in the context of
the MMWA), nor does he address whether courts should apply the
McMahon test under either prong of Chevron.125
II
WHICH TEST TO APPLY FIRST?
A. McMahon Before Chevron: Delegation Problems
In general, if Congress passes a statute that applies broadly to ar-
eas many agencies have regulated and that is in direct tension with
those agencies' interests, only the courts, and not any particular
agency, have the authority to interpret the statute.' 26 Nor may admin-
istrative agencies claim power to interpret statutes where Congress did
not delegate to them such power. 127 Given the breadth of the FAA
and its interpretation under McMahon, the first question presented is
whether Congress intended to carve out a separate regime precluding
binding arbitration when it passed the MMWA. 128 The McMahon
Court itself considered an SEC regulation that barred binding arbitra-
tion. 129 Given that the FAA is an act of Congress and not a regulation,
it would raise serious questions of implied repeal if Congress dele-
gated power to an agency to repeal a broadly applicable law of Con-
gress's own making. 130 In fact, after noting the existence of the
"'federal policy favoring arbitration,"' " 31 the McMahon Court acknowl-
edged the supremacy of Congress in its control of the law when it
stated that "the Arbitration Act's mandate may be overridden by a
contrary congressional command."1 32 In answering the question of
applying the FAA to the MMWA, the McMahon test provides that an
123 See generally Lloyd, supra note 12 (arguing that Chevron is the determinative test).
124 See id. at 4, 10-13.
125 See id. at 21-24.
126 See Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 816 F.2d
730, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd, 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
127 See Dubois v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1285 n.15 (1st Cir. 1996).
128 See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987); see also
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) ("Section 2
[of the FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements .... ").
129 See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 234 n.3.
130 See Recent Case, supra note 111, at 1205.
131 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24).
132 Id.
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exception to the FAA is discernible from the "text, history, or pur-
poses of the statute."'' 33
B. The Text, Legislative History, and Purpose
1. The Text
The text of the statute itself provides significant support for the
interpretation that Congress intended to preclude binding arbitra-
tion. Throughout the statute, the text assumes that informal dispute
settlement procedures, including arbitration, will be offered as pre-
requisites, and not bars, to suit in court. For example, the statute in-
structs the FTC to promulgate rules that require the manufacturer/
warrantor to provide in the warranty "[i]nformation respecting the
availability of any informal dispute settlement procedure offered by
the warrantor and a recital, where the warranty so provides, that the
purchaser may be required to resort to such procedure before pursu-
ing any legal remedies in the courts."' 134
Most significantly, in the section detailing the right of warrantors
to require the use of informal dispute settlement procedures, the
MMWA explicitly considers these procedures to only be prerequisites
to suit.135 The MMWA states,
If-(A) a warrantor establishes such a procedure, (B) such proce-
dure, and its implementation, meets the requirements of such rules
[promulgated by the FrC], and (C) he incorporates in a written
warranty a requirement that the consumer resort to such procedure
before pursuing any legal remedy under this section respecting such
warranty, then (i) the consumer may not commence a civil ac-
tion .. .under subsection (d) of this section unless he initially re-
sorts to such procedure .... 136
In discussing the commission's power to review the operation of
informal dispute settlement procedures, the MMWA states that " [t] he
Commission on its own initiative may ... review the bona fide opera-
tion of any dispute settlement procedure resort to which is stated in a
written warranty to be a prerequisite to pursuing a legal remedy under
this section."13 7 If the drafters intended to allow warrantors to estab-
lish binding arbitration procedures, they would not have discussed the
commission's authority to regulate those procedures in terms of pro-
cedures to be used prior to pursuing a lawsuit. The drafters could not
have intended warrantors to be able to establish both binding and
nonbinding arbitration but then allow the FTC to only regulate non-
133 Id. at 227.
34 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(8) (2000).
135 See id. § 2310(a) (3).
136 Id. (emphasis added).
137 Id. § 2310(a) (4).
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binding arbitration when binding arbitration would obviously be
much more dangerous to consumers.
The meaning of the term "informal dispute settlement proce-
dure"-which is defined nowhere in the MMWA-and arbitration's
status as such a procedure are at the center of the debate because the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuit decisions held that arbitration is a "formal"
type of settlement procedure and thus not covered by the MMWA.138
Both circuits went on to strike down the FTC rule, holding that it
either failed prong one or prong two of the Chevron test because the
rule conflicted with the FAA.13 9 If the phrase "informal dispute settle-
ment procedure" included "arbitration," then the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuit readings of the MMWA would not make sense, and one could
only read the MMWA as expressing Congress's clear intent to pre-
clude binding arbitration 140 and to delegate power to the FTC to reg-
ulate any form of arbitration under the MMWA. 141
As Lamis argues, reading the MMWA as not addressing binding
arbitration at all would render many provisions of the MMWA "non-
sensical.' 42 According to Lamis, during the period that Congress
passed the MMWA, the Supreme Court lumped together "negotiation,
mediation, voluntary arbitration, and conciliation" as "'dispute settle-
ment procedures.' "143 Lamis also notes that the American Arbitration
Association gave its Dictionary of Arbitration and Its Terms the subtitle "A
Concise Encyclopedia of Peaceful Dispute Settlement." 144 The Colum-
bia Encyclopedia at the time defined "industrial arbitration" as a
"'method of settling disputes.' ,,145
However, the word "informal" is more difficult to define. 146 If
arbitration is an "informal dispute settlement procedure," then the
MMWA dictates, as shown above, that arbitration may only serve as a
prerequisite to suit. As the Fifth Circuit pointed out, arbitration is
normally thought of as a formal procedure and an alternative to litiga-
138 See Davis v. S. Energy Homes, 305 F.3d 1268, 1275-76 (11 th Cir. 2002); Walton v.
Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 475-76 (5th Cir. 2002).
139 See Davis, 305 F.3d at 1280; Walton, 298 F.3d at 475.
140 See, e.g., Wilson v. Waverlee Homes, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1530 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (dis-
cussing the text and legislative history of the MMWA but not reaching the question of
whether the MMWA precludes binding arbitration under the FAA due to the lack of con-
tractual relationship between Wilson and Waverlee Homes), affd, 127 F.3d 40 (11 th Cir.
1997), abrogated by Davis, 305 F.3d 1268.
141 Cf Walton, 298 F.3d at 480 (King, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that courts are bound
to defer to the FTC's interpretation of the MMWA).
142 Lamis, supra note 11, at 182.
143 Id. at 190 (citing Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396
U.S. 142, 143, 148-50 (1969)).
144 Id. at 192 & n.68.
145 Id. at 192 n.69 (quoting THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 95 (3d ed. 1964)).
146 See id. at 193.
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tion.147 Under this reading, litigation itself would be a dispute settle-
ment procedure of sorts and the distinction would be between formal
and informal dispute settlement procedures. The Eleventh Circuit
has also adopted this view. 14 It rested this interpretation on a refer-
ence to "formal arbitration" in the Senate Report considering an early
version of the MMWA. 14 9 From this reference the court concluded
that the Senate viewed arbitration as a "formal" method of dispute
settlement that was not included as an "informal dispute settlement
procedure" that the FTC was delegated power to regulate. 150
This view, however, does not accurately describe the understand-
ing of the words "formal" and "informal" at the time Congress passed
the MMWA. 15 1 As then-ChiefJudge Carolyn Dineen King pointed out
in her dissent, arbitration was generally viewed at that time as an infor-
mal procedure.1 5 2 By contrast, the current view of arbitration is as a
binding and relatively formal alternative to litigation. Chief Judge
King pointed to several commentators who described arbitration as
"informal" and who described the shift as from more informal arbitra-
tion that prevailed prior to the Supreme Court's "revitaliz[ation]" of
the FAA to more formal arbitration that came into existence after that
time. t 5 3 The most plausible reading of the words "formal arbitration"
in the 1969 Senate Report is that they were to describe court-annexed
or judicial arbitration. 154 Judicial arbitration was just being imple-
mented about a decade before the 1969 Senate Report.1 55 While con-
sidering an earlier version of the MMWA, several senators classified
the word "arbitration" as a subspecies of "voluntary settlement proce-
dures," demonstrating that the senators understood arbitration as be-
ing delegated for regulation to the FTC along with other informal
dispute settlement procedures.1 56 Thus, along with these other proce-
dures, arbitration would be a prerequisite, not a bar, to suit. The FTC
147 See Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 475-76 (5th Cir. 2002).
148 See Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1276 (11 th Cir. 2002).
149 See id. (quoting S. REP. No. 91-876, at 22-23 (1970)).
15o See id.
151 See Lamis, supra note 11, at 207.
152 See Walton, 298 F.3d at 484 (King, C.J., dissenting).
153 See id.
154 See Lamis, supra note 1], at 207.
155 See id.
156 Id. at 206. Senator Marlow W. Cook, a member of the Senate Subcommittee that
considered the bill, proposed an amendment that asked the National Institute for Con-
sumer Justice to conduct a study of "existing and potential voluntary settlement proce-
dures, including arbitration." Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 92-269, at 63 (1971)) (emphasis
omitted). Senator Robert Joseph Dole, speaking in favor of the amendment, asked for
more data on the "'effectiveness of existing procedures such as small claims courts, class
actions, and private dispute settlement techniques, including arbitration in resolving con-
sumer grievances.'" Id. (quoting 117 CONG. REc. 39,590, 39,626 (1971)) (emphasis
omitted).
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chairman also demonstrated this understanding during his
testimony.1 5
7
2. Legislative History
The MMWA's legislative history demonstrates that it would be in-
consistent to construe the MMWA as not addressing arbitration but as
addressing informal dispute settlement procedures and litigation.
Chief Judge King's dissent pointed to several important places in the
legislative history where Congress was thinking of a dichotomy be-
tween all forms of private dispute settlement and litigation.1 58 Fur-
thermore, the Conference Committee gave broad meaning to the
words in the MMWA when it used the term "informal dispute settle-
ment procedures" interchangeably with "internal or other private dis-
pute settlement procedures."1 59
A couple of important points in the legislative history support the
proposition that Congress intended arbitration to be a prerequisite to
suit. In fact, the House Report on the MMWA explicitly makes this
point, stating that "[a] n adverse decision in any informal dispute set-
tlement proceeding would not be a bar to a civil action on the war-
ranty involved in the proceeding."' 60 This statement is the most
explicit consideration of whether Congress intended these procedures
to be binding; the statement pointedly rejects such a possibility. The
sentence concludes by noting that
the decision reached in any informal dispute settlement procedure
relating to any matter considered in such procedure would be ad-
missible in any civil action arising out of a warranty on a consumer
product if the procedure complies with the FTC's rules and is incor-
porated as a part of a written warranty pertaining to consumer
products. 16 1
Such a statement regarding the admissibility of findings of an infor-
mal proceeding in court would be unnecessary if the informal pro-
ceeding itself ultimately decided the issue.
Furthermore, in the debates themselves, Congressman Moss
clearly opined that the dispute settlement procedures did not bar suit.
In the debates surrounding an earlier version of the bill, he stated,
"[T] he bill is further refined so as to place a minimum extra burden
on the courts by requiring as a prerequisite to suit that the purchaser
157 See id. at 208. FTC Chairman Miles W. Kirkpatrick referred to the informal dispute
settlement procedures being discussed as an "arbitration remedy." See id. (emphasis
omitted).
158 See Walton, 298 F.3d at 491 (King, C.J., dissenting).
159 See id. (King, C.J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1408, at 26 (1974) (Conf.
Rep.)).
160 H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, at 41 (1974).
161 Id.
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give the [warrantor] reasonable opportunity to settle the dispute out
of court, including the use of a fair and formal dispute settlement
mechanism."'162 With this statement, Congressman Moss was noting
that the bill intended to balance the interests of consumers and war-
rantors by providing arbitration but not making it binding.
3. Purpose
The purpose of the MMWA conflicts with the purpose of the
FAA. While the purpose of the MMWA is to provide consumers with
efficient and affordable ways to resolve warranty disputes, 163 the FAA
seeks to overcome judicial antagonism toward arbitration agree-
ments.164 The MMWA, through carefully regulating arbitration and
providing attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs, aims to create
proconsumer remedies in contrast to the promerchant remedies of
the FAA. 165
C. Unique Problems with the Application of McMahon to the
MMWA
Applying the McMahon test to the MMWA presents several unique
problems. First, the MMWA went into effect twenty-one years after
Wilko166 and eleven years before the resurrection of the FAA in Mitsub-
ishi.167 Although it might make sense to apply the FAA to statutes
enacted only a few years later, such as the 1933 and 1934 Acts (despite
the principle of stare decisis),' 68 such application makes no sense
when the intervening court decisions greatly limited the FAA's reach.
Furthermore, the MMWA created an entirely separate regime of
arbitration. While the FAA aims to ensure that courts enforce private
agreements to arbitrate, 169 the MMWA attempts to protect consumers
from predatory practices and to provide them with efficient and af-
fordable remedies to enforce their rights under a warranty.1 70 The
MMWA lays out in detail the requirements for the arbitration proce-
dures so as to protect consumers from unfair procedures. 71
162 119 CONG. REC. 926, 972 (1973).
163 See 15 U.S.C. § 2302 (2000).
164 See9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
165 Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302, 2310, with 9 U.S.C. § 2.
166 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
167 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
168 See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the "issue decided today has been kept alive inappropriately by
this Court" and that the reasoning of Wilko had been abandoned).
169 See9 U.S.C. § 2.
170 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302, 2310(1); see also id. § 2310(d)(2) (allowing the successful
consumer to recover costs, including attorneys' fees).
171 See id. § 2310.
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D. The McMahon Precedents Do Not Support Binding
Arbitration for MMWA Claims
None of the precedents under McMahon are analogous to the
MMWA and the FTC regulations promulgated under it. Throughout
its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit cited several cases in the McMahon
line.1 72 In two of the cases, the Supreme Court applied the FAA be-
cause the statute conferred jurisdiction to federal courts and prohib-
ited waiver of rights but did not address arbitration anywhere in its
text. 173 In another case, the argument against application of the FAA
stemmed from the "'importance of the private damages remedy."1 7 4
The remaining cases in the McMahon line fail to support a finding
that the MMWA does not preclude binding arbitration.1 75 In its inter-
pretation of the Securities Act in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Ameri-
can Express, Inc., 17 6 the Court found that the language that conferred
concurrent jurisdiction on state courts was nearly identical to that
which conferred exclusive jurisdiction in the Exchange Act, which Mc-
Mahon interpreted as not precluding binding arbitration.1 77 The
Court also found that concurrent jurisdiction would be even more
favorable to an interpretation that Congress did not intend to pre-
clude binding arbitration because concurrentjurisdiction would allow
forum-selection clauses similar to those in agreements to arbitrate.178
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Court held that a
contract signed as a condition of employment was subject to binding
arbitration under the FAA. 179 The Court decided that granting con-
current jurisdiction to federal courts to hear cases involving the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) was insufficient to pre-
clude binding arbitration agreements entered into voluntarily.180 Fur-
thermore, the Court found that granting jurisdiction to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to enforce the ADEA
was not sufficient to preclude binding arbitration.181 In one place,
the ADEA does address arbitration and requires that "[b]efore insti-
tuting any action under [the ADEA], the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission shall attempt to eliminate the discriminatory
practice or practices alleged, and to effect voluntary compliance with
172 See Davis v. S. Energy Homes, 305 F.3d 1268, 1273-77 (11th Cir. 2002).
173 See Lloyd, supra note 12, at 24.
174 Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
635 (1985)).
175 See id. at 23-25.
176 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
177 See id. at 482.
178 See id. at 482-83.
179 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
180 See id. at 28-29.
181 See id. at 28.
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the requirements of [the ADEA] through informal methods of concil-
iation, conference, and persuasion."' 82 The Court pointed to this lan-
guage in Gilmer to show that the ADEA actually encouraged
arbitration. 83 However, the ADEA only addresses arbitration in terms
of the EEOC and does not establish a structure that creates arbitration
as a prerequisite while explicitly reserving the right to pursue other
legal remedies. 184 Furthermore, although the ADEA gives an individ-
ual plaintiff the right to file a civil action, nowhere does the ADEA
address arbitration in the context of the individual plaintiff.8 5 Unlike
the MMWA, the ADEA does not establish a separate regime regulating
the methods of informal settlement, indicating the importance of this
regulation to the framers of the MMWA.
The decision in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph,186
which the Eleventh Circuit cited for the proposition that arbitration is
sufficient to protect consumers,187 has little bearing on the MMWA
because the issue in that case was not whether the Truth in Lending
Act (TILA), the statute at issue, itself precluded binding arbitration,
but whether the costs of arbitration more generally would make bind-
ing arbitration prohibitively expensive for the consumer. 18 8 The
Court did not address whether TILA evinced an intention to prohibit
binding arbitration, noting that the respondent did not raise the
issue. 18
9
The final point on which the Eleventh Circuit based its reasoning
is a supposed Supreme Court policy favoring arbitration. 190 Exten-
sions of reasoning of this sort are vulnerable to the criticism that they
supersede careful statutory interpretation. 191 Unlike the MMWA,
which explicitly addresses remedies other than litigation,1 9 2 the provi-
sions of the Exchange Act at issue in McMahon do not address other
remedies but simply confer exclusive jurisdiction on the district courts
and preclude the waiver of compliance with any of its substantive
provisions. 193
182 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2000), held unconstitutional by Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62 (2000).
183 See 500 U.S. at 29.
184 Cf § 626(b), (d) (establishing enforcement procedures in civil court actions).
185 See id. § 626(d).
186 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
187 See Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002).
188 See Randolph, 531 U.S. at 90.
189 See id.
190 See Davis, 305 F.3d at 1279 (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S.
265, 279 (1995)).
191 See Lamis, supra note 11, at 245.
192 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302(a), 2310 (2000).
193 See 482 U.S. 220, 227-28 (1987).
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III
SHOULD THE COURT GrvE CHEVRON DEFERENCE?
A. Delegation with the Force of Law
After noting that Congress expressed a clear intent to preclude
binding arbitration (or at least binding "informal dispute settlement
procedures"), which presumably satisfies the McMahon test, several
questions remain. The first is whether the FTC can determine the
contours of these settlement procedures under Chevron. Another
question is, if the congressional intent regarding arbitration is not
clear enough, whether the FTC can define "informal dispute settle-
ment procedure[s]" to preclude binding arbitration. Finally, some
courts take the approach that the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits took and
find that the controlling issue is a Chevron issue, focusing on whether
the FTC has the authority to promulgate regulations under the
MMWA which preclude binding arbitration. 194 This Part will address
those questions.
Under current interpretations of the Chevron doctrine, agency in-
terpretations of congressional statutes deserve deference when Con-
gress delegates interpretative authority to an agency with the intent,
either explicit or implicit, that the agency make rules that carry the
"force of law."'195 In Mead, the Court noted that authorizing "notice-
and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication" provided good evi-
dence of a delegation to make rules carrying the force of law. 196
Here, Congress delegated broad authority to the FTC to promulgate
rules for warranties, and the FTC did in fact engage in notice-and-
comment rulemaking. 197 Furthermore, the Court traditionally gives
the greatest weight, regardless of whether it gives Chevron deference,
to agency rules promulgated in an area of agency expertise. 198 Not
only does the FTC have a long history of promulgating rules in the
area of consumer protection, but it has conducted extensive studies in
194 See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Matthews, 848 A.2d 577 (Del. Ch. 2004).
195 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
196 See id. at 230-31.
197 See § 2302(a), (b) (authorizing the FTC to prescribe rules on the content of war-
ranties); § 2309(a) (requiring that the FTC allow oral presentation of comments in addi-
tion to normal notice-and-comment procedures); id. § 2310 (delegating to the FTC broad
authority to create standards for the informal dispute settlement procedures created by the
MMWA); Rules, Regulations, Statements, and Interpretations Under Magnuson-Moss War-
ranty Act, 40 Fed. Reg. 60,168, 60,190 (Dec. 31, 1975) (stating that the FTC engaged in
notice-and-comment procedures in accordance with the MMWA, including the require-
ment of providing opportunity for oral presentations).
198 See Lloyd, supra note 12, at 27 (citing FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 720
(1948), cited for same proposition in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 251 n.4
(2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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the area of warranties, laying the groundwork for the MMWA and pro-
viding data for its own rulemaking.1 99
B. Delegation: Express or Implied?
The delegation to the FTC under the MMWA is an express dele-
gation. The statutory language gives the FTC broad power to "pre-
scribe rules setting forth minimum requirements for any informal
dispute settlement procedure." 200 Only a limited reading would sug-
gest that Congress intended the delegation to encompass mediation
and other dispute resolution methods, but not arbitration.201
As noted above, the MMWA does not define the term "informal
dispute settlement mechanism."20 2 However, given the MMWA's leg-
islative history and the use of the term at the time, the drafters proba-
bly intended the term to encompass any nonjudicial remedy,
including arbitration.20 3
Even if there is not an express delegation, there is an implied
delegation because the agency has a duty to regulate the content of
the warranties and the procedures themselves. 20 4 Thus, there is a gap
in the statute that the agency, given its broad power to regulate in this
area, may fill.20 5 Furthermore, the agency may promulgate regula-
tions in this area even if" 'Congress did not actually have an intent' as
to a particular result" for the specific question at issue. 20 6
C. Statutory Language
One of the more disputed questions in the literature and the
court cases is whether Congress intended to delegate power to the
FTC to regulate arbitration, including binding arbitration, in addition
to or as a part of its delegation of power to regulate informal dispute
settlement procedures. 207 With both a broad delegation of powers to
regulate warranties and an ambiguity in the statute, this seems to be
199 See CLARK & SMITH, supra note 21, § 14:2; Lloyd, supra note 12, at 26 n.190.
200 §2310(a)(2).
201 The majority in Walton avoided this problem by holding that the statute does not
address binding arbitration at all and thus Congress spoke to the issue when it passed the
FAA. See 298 F.3d 470, 475 (2002). The dissent in Walton pointed to the circularity of a
reading that states that Congress spoke to an issue in a prior statute when the application
of that same prior statute to the later statute is the legal question. See id. at 483-84 (King,
C.J., dissenting).
202 See supra Part II.B.
203 See id.
204 See §§ 2302, 2310.
205 See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
206 Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
845 (1984)).
207 SeeDavis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2002); Walton
v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 475-76 (5th Cir. 2002).
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the classic case for Chevron deference under either an express or im-
plied delegation theory.20 8
D. Substantive Considerations: Brown & Williamson
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. held that a court must
read statutory language in the context of broader statutory schemes to
determine whether statutory terms are ambiguous for the purposes of
a Chevron inquiry. 209 The Supreme Court determined that "[a] court
must.., interpret the statute 'as a symmetrical and coherent regula-
tory scheme' . . . and 'fit, if possible, all parts into a[ ] harmonious
whole."' 21 0 The Court next noted that the "meaning of one statute
may be affected by other Acts, particularly where Congress has spoken
subsequently and more specifically to the topic at hand."21 1 The final
consideration in determining whether to give Chevron deference is the
likelihood that certain policy decisions are of such a magnitude that
Congress would not delegate them to an administrative agency. 212
This inquiry is "guided to a degree by common sense as to the manner
in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such eco-
nomic and political magnitude to an administrative agency." 213 Thus,
three important canons of statutory construction emerge from Brown
& Williamson: courts should interpret a current statute to fit into an
administrative scheme; courts may use subsequent statutes to interpret
language in a prior statute; and courts should not generally presume
Congress to delegate policy decisions of great national importance to
an administrative agency. 21 4
In her dissent in Walton, Chief Judge King noted that the canons
of construction articulated in Brown & Williamson clearly favor the idea
that Congress has never spoken to this issue and that there is no sub-
stantive reason for not giving Chevron deference. 2 15 In fact, as Chief
Judge King pointed out, the Walton majority's use of the FAA to inter-
pret the meaning of the MMWA is anomalous and inconsistent with
the basic tenets of Brown & Williamson and other Supreme Courtjuris-
208 See Walton, 298 F.3d at 482-85 (King, C.J., dissenting). ChiefJudge King explicitly
maintained that although the legislative history leaned toward concluding that arbitration
was included in the delegation to regulate informal dispute settlement procedures, there
was insufficient basis to make that conclusion and the agency was therefore entitled to
Chevron deference. See id. at 485 (King, C.J., dissenting).
209 See 529 U.S. 120, 132-33 (2000).
210 Id. at 133 (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995); FTC v.
Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389 (1959)).
211 Id.
212 See id.
213 Id.
214 See id.
215 See 298 F.3d 470, 483 (5th Cir. 2002) (King, C.J., dissenting).
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prudence.21 6 Specifically, the Supreme Court has never used "a prior,
less specific statute" to determine that Congress has "directly spoken to
the precise question" and then used that prior statute to create a gen-
eral policy on the issue.2 1 7
The FTC should receive deference under the first and third ten-
ets of Brown & Williamson: the interpretation of the administrative
scheme and the matters of great national importance. Nearly fifty
years separate the FAA from the MMWA.218 The MMWA was the first
piece of major consumer warranty legislation,219 not a piece of legisla-
tion in a long line of federal regulation of consumer products. 220 The
texts of the two statutes are sufficiently different to indicate different
regulatory schemes. The FAA broadly applies to "maritime transac-
tions" and "commerce," and does not grant an administrative agency
power to interpret or implement the Act.22 1 The MMWA, on the
other hand, applies specifically to "consumer products" and warran-
ties sold along with these products, 222 and delegates power to the FTC
to regulate the content of these warranties and the remedies for en-
forcement. 223 Finally, Congress clearly delegated to the FTC substan-
tial control over the informal dispute settlement procedures.
Therefore, unless these words clearly exclude arbitration, the only rea-
sonable conclusion is that Congress did not consider this to be a mat-
ter of such national importance that an agency should not decide it.
IV
APPLYING THE CHEVRON TEST TO THE FTC REGULATIONS
Once a court determines that it owes Chevron deference to an
agency interpretation, the Chevron test has two classic prongs: whether
Congress has spoken to the issue and whether the agency's determina-
tion was reasonable.2 2 4 This Note argues that Congress has not di-
rectly spoken to the issue and that the FTC's interpretation is
reasonable and consistent with congressional intent and other federal
legislation.
216 See id. (King, C.J., dissenting).
217 Id. (King, C.J., dissenting).
218 Congress passed the FAA in 1925, see Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925), and
the MMWA in 1974, see Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1974).
219 See CLARK & SMITH, supra note 21, § 14:1.
220 See id.
221 See9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
222 See 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (2000).
223 See id. §§ 2302(a), 2310.
224 The Court has engaged in analysis to determine whether Congress delegated to the
agency the ability to promulgate rules having the force of law and thus whether the Court
will give Chevron deference. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001); supra
Part II. The Chevron two-step is articulated in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
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A. Has Congress Directly Spoken to the Issue?
The majority in Walton concluded that Congress, in passing the
FAA nearly fifty years before the MMWA, had "directly spoken to the
precise question at issue" of whether warranties under the MMWA
may prohibit binding arbitration.225 As ChiefJudge King noted in her
dissent, this interpretation is particularly problematic because Con-
gress's intent with regard to one statute has never been found in "a
prior, less specific statute."226 Interpretations that find congressional
intent in prior, less specific laws violate two of the basic principles of
statutory interpretation: "the primacy of the last enacted statute" and
"the rule that the specific statute controls the general." 22 7 Further-
more, in its Chevron inquiries, the Court often looks to the legislative
history to determine whether Congress intended a delegation to an
agency to determine a result and whether Congress intended a partic-
ular result.228 Here, there is an express delegation to establish rules
for arbitration and thus to determine whether that arbitration is bind-
ing.229 Furthermore, even if there is no express delegation, there
clearly is an implied delegation within the broad scope of authority to
make settlement-procedure rules and the warranty rules themselves
because Congress does not directly address whether these procedures
are binding.230
B. Is the Agency's Interpretation Reasonable?
The FTC's interpretation that the statute precludes binding arbi-
tration is entirely reasonable based on the two reasons that the FTC
gave to justify its decision: first, the House Subcommittee Staff Report
indicated a congressional intent that the proceedings not be binding;
and second, the FTC itself felt that it could not promulgate guidelines
that would protect consumers in a system of binding arbitration. 23'
225 See 298 F.3d 470, 475 (5th Cir. 2002).
226 See id. at 483 (King, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
227 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
282-83 (2d ed. 2006) (italics omitted).
228 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (stating that the Court would use "traditional tools
of statutory construction" to determine whether Congress had an intent that precluded the
agency interpretation). Normally, legislative history is included among the traditional
tools of determining Congress's intent. See Walton, 298 F.3d at 487 (King, C.J., dissenting).
229 See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
230 See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
231 See Rules, Regulations, Statements, and Interpretations Under Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, 40 Fed. Reg. 60,168, 60,210 (Dec. 31, 1975). There is some difficulty with
the Subcommittee Staff Report. Although the Staff Report clearly indicates that consum-
ers need to be aware of their rights, including their right to pursue litigation, it does not
clearly address binding arbitration. See 120 CONG. REC. 31,318 (1974). However, it does
clearly state that one of the problems with the current system is that many consumers are at
the mercy of the manufacturers because the damage caused by most consumer goods is
not worth pursuing in litigation. See id. Clearly, the Staff Report is sympathetic to the
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The Davis majority argued that the FTC justifications amounted to
adopting a Wilko attitude toward arbitration that the Supreme Court
resoundingly rejected in the McMahon line of cases.2 32 However, as
Chief Judge King pointed out in her dissent, the FTC based its reason-
ing on an independent interpretation of the statute and not on a be-
lief that Congress would be hostile to binding arbitration. 233 In its
recent regulatory review of rules promulgated under the MMWA, the
FTC affirmed that it based its decision on the "plain language of the
Warranty Act" and that it considered, but rejected, proposals that
would have allowed binding arbitration. 234 This reasoning is consis-
tent with the reasoning offered in the original promulgation of the
rules and thus may be used to consider whether the FTC was reasona-
ble in promulgating the rule.235
The Eleventh Circuit concedes that the rationale that the FTC
uses will determine whether its rule is reasonable under the second
prong of Chevron. Given the rarity of a finding of unreasonable-
ness,236 the FTC's evidence of congressional intent,237 other evidence
of congressional intent not cited by the FTC,2 38 the reaffirmation of
findings in a regulatory review, 239 and the expertise of the FTC in this
area,240 the FT7C is reasonable in prohibiting binding arbitration
clauses in warranties governed by the MMWA. 241
C. Should McMahon Be Subsumed Under Either Chevron Prong?
The McMahon test should not be subsumed under either prong of
the Chevron test. Subsuming it under the first prong is particularly
problematic because doing so assumes that Congress spoke to a spe-
cific statutory issue in a prior, less specific statute. This also assumes
that Congress spoke to the scope of an agency's power in a statute that
does not even address the agency. As noted above, the Supreme
Court has never used "a prior, less specific statute" to determine that
Congress has "directly spoken to the precise question" and created a
consumer when it states that "the fate of aggrieved consumers usually rests with the seller/
manufacturer and its willingness to live up to its promises." Id.
232 See 305 F.3d 1268, 1279 (11th Cir. 2002).
233 See Walton, 298 F.3d at 487 (King, C.J., dissenting).
234 64 Fed. Reg. 19,700, 19,708 (Apr. 22, 1999).
235 See Walton, 298 F.3d at 488 n.12 (King, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge King ex-
plained that the Court normally disapproves of "'post-hoc' agencyjustifications" if the orig-
inal rationale was invalid. Id.
236 See infta notes 243-47 and accompanying text.
237 See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
238 See supra Part II.B.
239 See supra note 234-35 and accompanying text.
240 See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
241 See supra notes 231-35 and accompanying text.
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general policy interpreting a subsequent statute. 242 Subsuming the
McMahon test under step one of Chevron would be an unprecedented
extension of the national policy favoring arbitration and would elevate
it to an absolute policy compelling arbitration even when there is a
clear, contrary congressional intent.
The Eleventh Circuit's use of the reasonableness prong is unu-
sual because courts rarely use that prong to strike down an agency
interpretation. 243 The Supreme Court set the bar very low in one of
only two cases where it has given guidance regarding what constitutes
an unreasonable interpretation of ambiguous language. 244 In that
case, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board,245 the Court found unreasona-
ble the FCC's interpretation of a statute regarding network sharing
because the FCC ignored language that required it to consider
whether access was necessary for the competitor and whether failure
to provide the access would impair the competitor's ability to provide
services. 246 The FCC simply gave no importance to this language
when it allowed "'blanket access to incumbents' networks"' on an al-
most "'unrestricted'" basis. 247 In its interpretation of the MMWA, the
FTC has given meaning to a series of words in a reasonable way that is
consistent with definitions in both the scholarly literature and the leg-
islative history of the time. 248 In fact, as some scholars have noted, a
possible reason that the Supreme Court has avoided using the reason-
ableness prong to strike down legislation is that this prong would in-
ject "antidemocratic and under-informed judicial value choices" into
the fray.249
The Eleventh Circuit found the FTC rationale unreasonable be-
cause the staff subcommittee report was insufficient evidence of con-
gressional intent and because the FTC was relying on Wilko in refusing
to allow binding arbitration. 250 As this Note has argued, several pieces
of legislative history indicate Congress's intent that the informal dis-
pute settlement procedures addressed in the MMWA include arbitra-
tion and are not to be binding.251 Furthermore, the MMWA has a
242 Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 483 (5th Cir. 2002) (King, C.J.,
dissenting).
243 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 227, at 328-29.
244 See id. at 337-38.
245 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
246 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 227, at 337.
247 Id. at 337-38 (quoting AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at 390).
248 For a discussion of the meaning of the words and the legislative history, see supra
Part II.B.
249 ESKRDGE ET AL., supra note 227, at 338.
250 Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2002).
251 For a discussion of why Congress included arbitration under informal dispute set-
tlement procedures, see supra Part II.B. For a discussion of congressional intent with re-
gard to the nonbinding nature of the informal dispute settlement procedures, see id.
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fundamentally different purpose than the FAA. 25 2 The MMWA aims
to combat a situation in which consumers have little bargaining power
and in which the agreements that consumers sign are less than volun-
tary.253  The FAA, alternatively, focuses entirely on voluntary
arbitration. 254
CONCLUSION
The intersection of the MMWA and the FAA is a battleground
where two different doctrines meet: the Chevron doctrine regarding
judicial deference to agency rulemaking and the McMahon doctrine
regarding the federal policy favoring arbitration. Applying the McMa-
hon framework first, the statute clearly provides that arbitration in this
context should not be binding. Any other reading of the statute
would turn the statute's language on its head. Even after applying the
McMahon framework, any further discussion of the statute in the Chev-
ron framework clearly establishes that Congress did not intend for ar-
bitration under the MMWA to be binding and that the FTC's
delegated power under the MMWA to regulate arbitration is very
broad. Therefore, under any reading, the MMWA precludes binding
arbitration.
252 See Lamis, supra note 11, at 240.
253 See id. at 240-41.
254 See id. at 237-39.
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